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TENANT SYSTEMS IN JAPAN 
AND COREA 
I. TENANT SYSTEMS IN JAPAN 
Crop-sharing tenant system (Ia metairie) generally pre-
vailed in the early stage of the history of J apan_ This is 
evidenced by the existence of the same system in some 
parts of the country at present. However, Japan's tenant 
system is now in a transient stage,-between the old share 
system and the capitalistic tenant system such as now exists 
in England_ 
A Japanese tenant farmer does not simply offer his 
labour to the landlord for the cultivation of the land and 
receive some share of the crop; nor does he always follow 
the direction of the landowner: he enjoys nearly complete 
independence in the management of his farm; owns his 
cattle, implements and barns; buys his own seeds and 
manures, in general; and, although the farm rent is paid 
in the form of products, its amount is fixed by mutual 
agreement and is not determined by rate according to the 
amount of crop_ It is evident then that the system is no 
longer a pure crop-sharing tenant system_ 
On the other hand, a close study of the system reveals 
that tenants' independence in managing their farms is to 
some extent limited; and they are in a condition in which 
they must expect the landlord's interference and supervisioI} 
in selecting seeds and in determining the general policy of 
cultivation_ It also often happens that tenants receive the 
total or a partial supply of farm implements, seeds and 
manures from the landlord_ Although the amount of farm 
rent is fixed, the agreement between the landlord and tenants 
does not require the tenants to pay that amount under all 
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circumstances, nor to shoulder upon themselves the loss 
arising from bad crops; nor to refrain from shifting that 
loss to the landlord. As the amount of farm rents is 
usually based upon the amount of the average crop, the 
tenants demand a reduction in case of bad crops; and the 
numerous tenant disputes in Japan in recent years are 
largely related to disagreement regarding the amount of 
this reduction in farm rent. Thus, although the amount of 
farm rent is fixed for convenience' sake, our tenant system 
preserves a share system at least in spirit and the actual 
payment of the rent is made after taking the amount of 
crop into consideration. It is evident then that our tenant 
system has not yet evolved into an independent capitalistic 
tenant system as is seen in England at present. 
There are a very few cases in which the period and 
other items of an agreement between the landlord and 
tenants are set down in a formal written form; the majority 
of the agreements are verbal ones which are carried out as 
a matter of custom. In a very few cases the terms of an 
agreement are specified; in a great majority the agreements 
are verbal and can be abrogated by either party, especially 
by the landlord, pmvided the intention of such abrogation 
is made known beforehand, its time being determined by 
custom. As long as no such abrogation takes place, the 
agreement is regarded as binding on both parties. This is 
another indication that our tenant system has many elements 
of the primitive system and that it is on a transient stage 
between the old and modern systems. In order to prove 
this proposition more fully, I shall hereafter elucidate several 
points showing the nature of our system. 
The following information regarding the practice of 
tenant farmers with reference to the period of a tenant 
agreement is based upon the investigation into the tenant 
customs made by the Agricultural Bureau of the Agriculture 
and Commerce Department. "Usually no period of cultiva· 
tion is specified, and a tenant is allowed to cultivate his 
tenant land continuously. provided he committed no wrong 
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against the landlord. The majority of the periods of tenant 
agreements are between three to five years, and they usual-
ly have a provision to the effect that the landlord shaIl 
have the right to get back the land whenever he deems 
necessary. In the case of fruit or mulberry gardens which 
require a longer period of CUltivation, the term of an agree-
ment is from ten to fifteen years. When the landlord 
desires, upon the violation of the agreement by the tenant 
• or upon other similar wrong, to abrogate the agreement, 
the usual custom is that the landlord gets back the field . 
some time between the November of the preceeding year 
and the February of a given year, without any cempensa-
tion if the field has no standing grain, but with a partial 
compensation, if the field has the standing grain, for the 
labour the tenant put in, seeds, and manures which had 
been used. But, in case the tenant wishes to return the 
field to the landlord, he gets no compensation at all.'' 
Under such a practice, tenant agreements in Japan 
continued to be in force for many years. It is not seldom 
that farmers tenant the same farms throughout their entire 
life time, and often their sons inherit the agreement after 
their fathers' death. Most tenants as weIl as landlords 
have a very vague legal conception .of such agreements, 
the terms of which seems to exist only' in name. Agree-
ments can be abrogated by either party, as a matter of 
custom, provided a previous announcement to that effect is 
made at a required time. 
Nearly all rents for rice fields are made over to the 
landlord in the form of rice, with a very few exceptions in 
which case they' are paid in cash by a special agreement. 
In most cases rice is made over after it has been huIled, 
but in some cases unhuIled rice is delivered. . In case of 
two-crop fields, no rent is generaIly paid for the second 
·crop, but where rent is paid it is. made over in the form 
of rape seed, barley, or rye. This practice is in conformity 
with the idea that rent should be paid according to the 
nature of a crop. 
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Rents for fields other than rice fields are of various 
kinds. Their kinds usually depend on the nature of pro· 
ducts, and the area of the fields, and are not unified as in 
the case of rice·fields. Generally speaking, rice is used in 
most cases, but sometimes soy beans, barley and cash are 
paid. In some localities rye and millet are used. Only in 
few cases wheat, beans, sweet potato, raw silk, hemp, paper, 
raw material of paper, carrot, corn, rope seed, sugar, and 
unginned cotton take the place of rice. 
Thus, rent for rice fields is paid, in general, in the 
form of rice, and that for other fields and gardens in the 
form of rice, or wheat, or other farm products; and thus 
the system is a remnant of the primitve agricultural system. 
Although it has not yet reached the monetary economy, in 
some places rent is made over to the landlord in cach at 
the prevailing price of rice by mutual agreement. Such 
exception is seen mostly in the farming district adjacent 
to great cities or in sericultural communities. It indicates 
the direction in which the tenant system in our country is 
moving. 
It is very difficult to get the average amount of farm 
rent because of the differences in the productive powers of 
soils, in the number of both landlords and tenants, and in 
their social standings and economic powers. But the report 
on the tenant practice made by the Agricultural Bureau 
points out that for the medium·quality land, the average 
farm rent for one·crop rice field of one tan, actually 
paid during five years 1908-1912, was 8 koku 9 sho 8 
go, and that of two-crop rice field for the same period was 
1 koku 1 to 5 sho 6 go. j) In the case of gardens, where 
the rent was paid in the form of rice, rice amounting to 5 
to 7 sho 1 go was made' over; where the rent takes the 
form of beans 4 to 5 sho 6 go was paid in; where the rent 
consists in barley 8 to 3 go was made aver. The amount 
of rent in the 'case of one grain land constitutes 53.5 percent 
1) 1 tan =.245 acre; 1 to =3.9703 gallons dry weight; 1 sho is one-tenth 
of 1 to; and 1 go is one-tenth of 1 sho; 1 koku= 10 to. 
, 
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of the total products, while that of two grain rice bed is 
56.9 percent of the total crop, (the second crop going usual-
ly entirely to the tenant.) In the case of truck garden it is 
more difficult to compare the rent with the total amount of 
• crop because the rent is paid in the form of several different 
products. 
Figures of farm rents on agreement and those which 
are actually paid differ greatly in different prefectures, and 
it is impossible to compare those which are actually paid in 
different prefectures. What we cannot but notice the fact 
that the amount of the rent fixed in the agreenment differs 
with the amount actually paid, in other words, there exists 
what is known as the actual rent, side by side with the 
fixed rent expressed in the agreement. Had Japan's tenant 
system been a capitalistic tenant system, both of these 
rents must be one-the tenant should pay what is fixed in 
the agreement regardless of the amount of the crop. But 
in actuality this difference exists, because, as has already 
been pointed out, Japanese tenants believe that the amount 
of rent should be determined by the nature of the crop, 
and that, in consequence, when the crop is bad, the amount 
of the rent should be correspondingly reduced. Because of 
this practice, our tenant system has the quality of a share 
system under which the rent is determined according to the 
amount of the crop and a certain proportion is maintained 
between the two. 
This proportion in the case of our system runs between 
46 percent and 56 percent, and thus approaches the half-
share system. I believe that this is an indication that our 
system is akin to the Metayer (Ia Metairie). It may be 
that the half·share system underwent an evolution in the 
course of time and the average amount was adopted as the 
standard rent, but at the same time the fixed amount had 
to be checked by the idea and practice of the share system. 
I believe that the tenant system in the early stages of 
Japan's history was a half-share system_ 
At least it is impossible to believe that the determina-
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tion of the amount of farm rent in Japan is controlled by 
the Ricardian idea of fann rent. Just as the Ricardian 
theory. of rent cannot be applied directly on the Metayer. 
system which is found in France and Italy, so it also seems 
to be impossible of application in our present tenant system. 
I wish to point out real facts as to how exemption or 
reduction is made in farm rent in case of a bad crop, and 
how the risk of such loss is borne by the landlord in our 
system. Before I undertake this task, however, I wish to 
dwell on the amount of rent in the case of two-crop fields 
and the actual payment of such a rent. 
It seems natural that the rent of a two·crop field should 
be higher than that of a one·crop one. As stated above, in 
the case of medium·quality fields, the average amount of 
rent actually paid for one tan of the one·crop field is 8.98 
to, while that of the two-crop field is 11.56 to. In con· 
sequence, the percentage between the rent and the total 
amount of crop is higher in the case of the two·crop field. 
In the medium-quality fields, this percentage in the case of 
the one·crop field is 53.5 percent, while that in the case of 
the two·crop system is 56.9. Even the percentage of the 
rent of low·quality one·crop fields, throughout the country, 
is 51.1, while that of high·quality one·crop fields is as high 
as 54.7. In the case of two·crop fields, the percentage of 
low·quality fields is 54.6 and that of high·quality fields is 
58.2. The fact that a Japanese tenant pay rents which are 
more than one half of the total amount of crop is signifi· 
cant, when one considers it together with another fact that 
our system has alreadY outgrown a share·tenant system and 
that the landlord only ·offers his fields to the tenant and 
improves them, while the tenant has to buy seeds and 
manure by himself. 
Although a Japanese tenant is placed in a condition as 
miserable as that under the primitive share-system, and despite 
the fact that he buys seeds, manures, and farm implements, 
he pays a rent which is higher than that under a share 
system in which a tenant gets a supply of these farming 
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necessaries. Our tenants are thus placed in a great pre-
dicament. The reasons for this system are not far to seek. 
In the first place, although the concentration of land owner-
ship did not take place extensively in our country, over-
• population in agricultural communities had a disastrous 
effect upon the tenant·farmers inasmuch as demand for rice-
fields exceeded supply. The laws of supply and demand 
operated in favour of the landlord. In the second place, 
the social position of the landed proprietors and their powers 
which are the remnants of the feudal system had the same 
effect against the interest of tenants. Lastly, the fact that 
our tenants are favoured by the Nature-fertile fields, 
temperate climate and the proper amount of rain-enabling 
them to produce more than under other conditions,-must 
have contributed towards making their rent higher than 
that of the share-system, namely, one half of the crop. 
The foregoing circumstances also gave rise to a peculiar 
custom in our tenant system, and that is the custom of the 
tenant's turning in an extra amount of rents in various 
parts of the country. The custom is known under various 
names such as "kuchimai," or U komimai," or "sashimai," 
each of which designates an extra amount of rice which is 
turned in by a tenant to his landlord at the time of the 
payment of the normal rent. This custom continued to 
exist since the time of the feudal period and, is still found 
in some parts of the country. This enables the landlord to 
secure a rent which is actually larger than the amount 
agreed upon. Although it is a system curious enough at 
first sight, yet it is in reality a very natural phenomenon 
where the landlord occupies such a powerful position as is 
occupied by the Japanese landlord. Although the amount 
of this extra rent differs in different regions, the most 
general practice is to add one or two sho for every sack of 
four to (5%). 
This custom, however, is practised less extensively at 
present. After the adoPtion of a system of rice inspec-
tion and the unification of the rice sacks by the rice 
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growers' associations in prefectures, the custom has been 
on a gradual decrease. Very often landlords have abandon· 
ed the custom in order to let their tenants produce rice of 
a good quality and to turn in part of the crop as rent, and 
sometimes a discount in the form of rice is adopted by 
some landlords with the same purpose.. Sometimes a cash 
prize is given to a successful tenant. However, the custom 
of extra rent has not yet entirely disappeared from the 
countrY. 
I shall return to the question of reduction of farm rent 
in case of a bad crop. As has been already stated, the 
tenant does not pay as a matter of practice the amount of 
rent fixed by an agreement, if the crop is bad .. On the 
other hand, no additional rent is exacted by the landlord 
in case of an exceptionally good crop. In this way rent is 
fixed at a maximum consistent with the tenant's ability to 
pay, but it is precisely this that causes disputes at the 
time of a bad crop regarding the reduction of the rent, 
which is arrived at after a conference between the tenant 
and the landlord. There is found in some places a practice 
which is a "permanent reduction" in rent. Under this 
system the average amount of the crops of a dozen or more 
years is taken, and a amount little less than usual rent and 
also the ordinary amount is fixed as a permanent rent, and 
no reduction is allowed by the landlord. 
The amount of reduction made in rent is not the same 
for every place, nor is there any standard of reduction; 
the amount differs in different places and under different 
circumstances. In some places, no reduction in rent is 
allowed in the case of a bad crop in fields other than rice 
fields because they usually yield more than two crops. 
The percentage of reduction in rent is generally determined 
by the summer crop both in rice·fields and other fields and 
gardens; and it is usually determined jointly by the land· 
lords of a giv\!n village or district. There are various 
methods by which the amount of reduction is fixed. The 
first method is that bot~ the tenant and the landlord joint-
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ly inspect the standing grain by measuring it by their eyes. 
The second method is to select a certain area of the rice· 
field which seems to represent the average of the field, and 
the grain taken out of this area is. measured in order to 
decide whether the crop is bad or not. The· second method 
is often carried out under the direction of the farmers' 
association of the village for all fields; but sometimes the 
judgments of the officials in charge of the standing grain 
exhibition of both the model and ordinary fields are used 
as the basis of the reduction in rent. But in some districts 
the method is used every year. In others, there is. a system 
under which the payment of some part of the rent is 
allowed to be made in the next year with no interest on 
deferred rent. 
In some places the entire rent is exempted in cases of 
extremely bad crops. 
The question of exempting or reducing the farm rent 
usually accompanies complicated troubles, and is the main 
cause of tenant disputes. But it is because of this reduc· 
tion that, although our tenant system has a fixed farm rent, 
in practice, has a share·system; and it is because of this 
practice that our farm rent cannot be compared with that 
of the Ricardian theory which would make rent difference 
of yielding according to the natural productivity of the 
soils; on the other hand, it contains, beside the theoreticai 
rent, something possessing the nature of a profit. At any 
rate, the practice is an interesting, though defective, point 
in our tenant system. 
I shall next consider the methods of the paymnet of 
rent. The time of payment differs with different rents. 
Payment in the form of rice is made before the end of 
December but exceptions can be found in which the end 
of January, next year, or the end of December in the 
Lunar Calendar is regarded as the last day. Cash payment 
is made eithe. at the end of the year or in two payments, 
the one in June or July, and the other at the end of the 
year. Payment in t~e form of soy beans is made either 
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the end of August or at the end of September; and that 
the form, of wheat or barley, either at the end of June 
July. 
As to the place of the payment, the ordinary custom is 
the tenant' takes the rice to the house or the barn of 
landlord or to those of his representative; but some· 
the landlord sends men to fetch the rent. Where the 
,village warehouse still stands, the transfer of the rice 
, place in that public warehouse. Sometimes the 
'is made in the rice inspection office. With the 
~'OPl!leJ~t of the' agricultural warehouses in recent years, 
is taking place more and more in those 
because it is convenient for both the tenant 
landlord to utilize them, as the inspection of rice 
with the transfer. The trans-
by the tenant when he takes 
~toJ:n:, ary for the tenant to use pure rice 
, ",·Where there exists a system of 
other purposes, the rice that passes 
is ',\JS1~allly accepted by the landlord, but in 
the grade of passable (inspection) and acceptable 
'tn't"". landlord) rice is specified, because the rice which 
the inspection is now always acceptable to the 
landlord. But the landlord usually gives either a cash prize 
or discount in order to encourage the tenant to produce as 
good rice as possible; and this system has been more and 
more widely accepted throughout the country. Our tenant 
system has no strict customary regulation on the packing 
of rice sacks (tawara) with reference to rent, but the new 
system of rice inspection which is more and more extensive-
ly adopted, has had the effect of urging the tenants to 
improve the packing, because the inspection is very strict 
about it. Where the weight as well as the quantity of 
rice are regarded. important, a limitation is imposed upon 
the weight of the sacks. 
In the old days the tenant was punished heavily for 
· ...... -------------------
• 
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his delinquency in paying rent, but in modem times such 
a heavy punishment has vanished, and the usual method 
of punishment at present is to exact interest on the amount 
of the unpaid rent, and in the extreme case of the delin-
quency the heaviest punishment is to take back the field 
from the delinquent tenant In reality, however, punish-
ment for such delinquency is seldom imposed because of 
the fact tenants are in a great demand and the landlords 
are making every inducement to get some one to till his 
soils. 
The following curious customs prevail in some parts 
of the country regarding the delinquency in question: In 
Kyoto prefecture, when a tenant who tills the soils of 
several landlords, fails to pay his rent to one of the land-
lords, the loss is distributed equally among aU the landlords, 
provided there is no hope of the tenant paying the rent 
In Gamo-o County, Shiga Prefecture, the delinquent rent is 
paid by a group called goningumi.1) Iyo County, Ehime 
Prefecture, has a system under which the delinquent rent 
is paid by all the tenants of a village, and the field is 
thereafter tilled by the collective labour of all tenants, in-
stead of returning it to the landlord. All of these methods 
are on the road to decay. 
Such is a rough sketch of the tenant system in our 
country. But the following may be added. In some 
districts, although the landlord is supposed to bear the 
entire expense for irrigating and improving the soil, the 
tenant actually shoulders a part of the expense; while in 
other districts the landlord either pays a part of the ex-
pense for irrigation, implements, seeds, and manures, or 
else loans the fund the tenant with no interest, although 
the general rule is that the tenant must pay for all these 
1). The "goningumi" or .. union of five families" is a self-governing, 
neighbourhood organization which existed in feudal Japan during the Toku-
gawa Era; it wd organized among the people of the agricultural, com-
merial, and industrial classes. each union being composed of five families 
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agricultural necessaries. The following exceptional practices 
are also found in various parts of the country. (1). The 
tenant offers his labour to the landlord during the busy 
agricultural period. (2). No rent is required by the land-
lord for the second crop of the rice fields.' (3). No rent is 
charged for extra use of the mulberry fields. (4). Contracts 
are made for the cash payment for tillage. (5). The tenant 
shoulders all taxes and dues, and the rent is somewhat 
cheaper than the ordinary one. (6). Fields yielding good 
crops are' paired with those yielding bad crops, when they 
rented out. (7). Money is deposited with or loaned to the 
landlord by the tenant and the interest thereof is regarded 
as rent. 
What I have explained so far is the typical Japanese 
tenant system, but there are sevei'al other forms in the 
different parts of the country. These systems somewhat 
resemble the ordinary tenant system, although they are less 
developed than the latter. Some of them are akin to a 
share-system. There are the following three main types:-
1. Flexible Tenant System. This system is one in 
which the amount of rent is not fixed, but is decided every 
year after examining the nature of the crop. This system 
has existed from early times, and is adopted chiefly in 
those districts where it is impossible to fix the amount of 
rent because of drought, floods, or other natural calamities. 
It is easy to see that the system is akin to the share 
system. Under the flexible system, the amount of rent is 
fixed after examining the nature of the annual crop, and 
the proportion of rent is not determined beforehand, as in 
the case of the share system; nor is it fixed once for all 
as in the case of the ordinary fixed rent system. After 
examining the crop, some part of the standing grain is 
decided to be the rent for a particular year, and this part 
is cut down, thrashed and hulled, before it is finally turn-
ed in to the landlord as rent. 
2. Composite 'Tenant System. This is one in which 




pastures, and resident quarters as a whole. This system 
is generally found in Hokkaido, but in Japan Proper it is 
an extraordinary svstem. In some cases only rice fields and 
other fields and gardens are included, while in others fields 
for rice sprouts, where rice is dried, and pastures are also 
included. 
3. Collective Tenant System. Under this system not 
a single farming family but two or more than two families 
together engage in tenant-farming. It is similar to the 
"Affittanza collettiva" of Italy. Like the Italian system, 
our system also is of the following two kinds: (1). The 
entire partnership (Affitfanza a condizione unital under which 
the entire farm is tilled by two or more tenantfarmers who 
contribute both capital and labour and who distribute gains 
between themselves. (2). The partial partnership (Affittanza 
a condizione divisa). Under this system, a certain part of 
the management of the farm is carried out collectively and 
the main task of tillage is done individually. Fields are 
rented in the name of the entire partnership but are divided 
among the members for their individual tillage. 
Our collective tenant syste.m is rather exceptional and 
its organization is so imperfect that it cannot be compared 
with the Italian system. It has been adopted in our country 
as a sort of experiment and in some cases owes its. existence 
to the necessity of some peculiar sets of circumstances in 
the past. However, I am of the opinion that with the 
growth of the union organization of tenants, the collective 
system also will be developed. 
The Agricultural Bureau's investigation into the custo-
mary practices among the tenant farmers shows that there 
are many systems under which some of collective tillage is 
carried out. In Niigata Prefecture many youngmen's associa: 
tions and organizations for studying agricultural affairs are 
collectively tenanting fields. The same thing can be said 
of many other prefectures. There is a system known as 
"Nakama-da" or "common field" in Tonami County, Toya-
ma Prefecture. Under this system, when a tenant farm 
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bas no one to till through the tenant's death or otherwise, 
bis relatives or neighbours till it. A certain village in Ishi· 
kawa Prefecture has a system by the name of "Yoriai· 
kosaku " or "collective tenant" under which fields are tilled 
collectively by the young men of the village, whose pur· 
pose is to get some pocket money. Naturally the area of 
the field is very small; it is sometimes one· fourth of an 
acre or a half acre. A system adopted in Satsuma County, 
Kagoshima Prefecture, is similar to the financial system of 
.. TanomOshi." Under this system, a group is formed by a 
landlord and usually four or five tenants. When such a 
group is formed some member is· selected to be the recipient 
of the crop of the first year and then he is succeeded by 
other members in following years. The recipient of the 
crop has to supply seeds, manures, and others; wbile all 
farmers engage in the work of tillage collectively. Each 
family (who is a member of the said group) has to can· 
tribute the labour of about three persons for the work of 
tillage. The recipient gets the entire crop. A system 
similar to the "Nakama·da" is found also in Yamagata 
Prefecture where a tenant body exists for the purpose of 
the collective management of a mulberry field; a similar 
system also exists in Tottori Prefecture for the purpose of 
the collective cultivation of a rice field; and lastly also ·in 
Hiroshima Prefecture, where tenants till the tenant farm 
collectively. Such cases must have been increased in many 
places since the investigation of the Agricultural Bureau 
was made. I must add that not all of those collective 
organizations are perfect collective bodies and that some of 
them are collective only in name. 
Although these special tenant systems are limited to 
only certain districts and in consequence are not very im· 
portant from the social and economic standpoint, they are 
entitled to special treatment and special classification, each 
having its characteristics and peculiarities. In addition to 
these systems, there is in our country a set of tenant 
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These practices are known under the name "Naka·kosaku" 
or "Mata·kosaku," (middle·tenant and re·tenanting). There 
is a middle man between the landlord and the tenant. He 
first rents the field from the landlord and then re·rents it 
to the tenant. There are the following three different cases 
which come under the category of this practice: (1). When 
either those who have a permanent tenant right or those 
'who have secured a tenant right over a certain field, 
transfer for a commercial purpose the tenant right to some 
one else at the risk of the failure of the tenant to pay his 
rent. (2). When a person, who is relegated by the landlord 
to rent the field, selects tenants and otherwise supervises 
the management of the field, acting within the power given 
him. (3) When a tenant re·rents the field to some one else 
with the purpose of getting a profit at the risk of latter's 
failure to pay the rent. 
Again, there is another custom under which the tenant 
gets the supply of a farm house, implements, cattle, seeds, 
manures, foods, fuels, etc.; and sometimes the tenant is 
employed in the household work of the landlord without 
special pay. Although it is possible to call this custom a 
tenant system, a tenant under the system is more a con· 
tract labourer than a tenant. 
What has been pointed out so far in this article shows 
how complicated our tenant systems are and how diversely 
interlocked are the different interests involved. Our systems 
are still in imperfect conditions, are far from being pure 
capitalistic tenant system and rather approach a contract 
labour' system. Our tenants are more of labourers than 
entrepreneur. 
II. TENANT SYSTEM IN COREA 
. 1. FORMS OF LAND TENURE 
The most common form of tenant systems in Corea is 
that Qf a crop·sharing system (Metairie). Corean tenants 
• 
• 
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make over a part of the crop as rent to their landlord. 
The rent is usually fixed on a percentage basis which is 
generally 50 percent of the amount of the crop." This is 
universally true with rice paddies, but in the case of dry 
fields a system of fixed rent is usually adopted and in a 
very few cases the rent is paid in cash. The fixed rent is 
a system under which the same amount of rent is paid 
irrespective of the nature of crops. The fact that the fixed 
rent is not adopted in the case of rice paddies, is due to 
the lack of proper facilities for irrigation and drainage in 
Corea. The lack of these facilities makes the fluctuation 
of crops inevitable, heavy rain and excessive drought provo 
ing disastrous upon crops. Moreover, the overwhelming 
majority of tenant farmers are so poor as to be incapable 
of bearing indus.trial losses caused by bad crops. It. is 
natural then that in the cases of swamp rice fields the 
system of fixed rent is adopted only where there are good 
facilities for irrigation and drainage. The common rate of 
fixed rent is 50 percent, although in some cases it is as low 
as 35 percent. 
The crop-sharing system in Corea is of two kinds: the 
estimation system under which the rent is based on the 
estimation of crop and the measurement system under which 
the rent is based upon the actual amount of a crop. Under 
the former system, the tenant and the landlord or his re-
presentative together make a survey of the standing grain 
of the rented field, generally measuring it with eyes. The 
rate of rent is usually 50 percent, but as the crop is often 
over-estimated, the rate often exceeds the 50 percent of the 
actual amount of the crop. On' the other hand, where the 
landlord is benevolent, the .rate is sometimes below 50 
percent of the actual amount. As this system accompanies 
the least amount of risks for poor tenants, it is extensively 
adopted in the case of wet fields. 
~) i!f~J~ 0) JJl~ p. 122-Agricl~lture in Corea (pubJished by the Corean 
Indmltrial Bank). l}i'J::t~rr~\lJ gr:;t}" p. 125-An Investigation into the Practices 
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The rent based on the actual amount of crop is determin-
ed in the presence of both the landlord and his. tenant 
either at the time of harvest by counting the number of 
rice stacks or by measuring the amount of hulled rice. In 
both cases the rent is fixed at 50 percent, but sometimes 
this is not the case because there is the question as to who 
shall bear the tax burden or the expense for seeds and 
who shall get the proceeds from the sale of rice straws. 
There are the following different cases:-
(a). . The crop is divided equally between the landlord 
and tenant, the former bearing the burden of the land tax 
and expenses for seeds. 
(b). First the tax burden and seed expenses are set 
aside by using part of the crop, and the remainder is 
divided equally between the landlord and tenant. 
(c). The landlord bears the tax burden, the tenant 
pays seed expenses, and the crop is divided equally between 
them. In some cases the rice straws are also divided equal-
ly between the two parties while in other cases they are 
given wholly to the tenant. 
(d). The landlord pay the seed expenses while the 
tenant bears the tax burden but gets the rice straws; the 
crop is divided equally among the two parties. 
(e). The crop is divided between the landlord· and 
tenant before it is thrashed and hulled, so that rice straws 
are also automatically divided equally between them. 
The foregoing methods are all based upon the funda-
mental idea that the crop should be divided equally between 
the parties; and are instituted in order to insure the equality 
of various burdens upon them, although in some cases those 
burdens are imposed upon the tenant as the result of his 
being helpless against the aggressive landlord. The can· 
sideration for securing equity is almost a universal pheno-
menon wherever a crop·sharing system is adopted, as is seen 
also in the cases of France, Italy and other countries." 
5) A. Buchenberger, Agrarwesen und Agrarpolitik, 2. Aufl. I Bd. S. 189. 
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Such considerations are necessary not only where the rent 
is based upon the actual amount of crop, but also where it 
is based upon the estimation of crop. The former method 
is the most primitive one, but I am of the opinion that it 
is most likely to secure justice for weak tenants. Under 
both systems no rent is paid for the second crop in the 
case of two·crop fields. 
Historically speaking, the measurement system was 
adopted very extensively in the past, but as time went on 
it became gradually replaced by the other system under 
which the rent is based upon the estimation of crop, which 
system is most universally adopted at present. This change 
was due to the fact that much trouble inevitablly accom· 
panied the first system. The recent tendency, however, is 
far removed from these crop·sharing systems. The landlord 
realizes that the fixed rent system is more desirable from 
the standpoint of intensive cultivation. He knows that the 
tenant under a share system does not use much manures 
nor works hard enough. Under a fixed rent system, on the 
other hand, the tenant is likely to work hard in order to 
increase the fertility of the soil, and is thus likely to get a 
greater crop, realizing what is increased goes to his pocket 
only." Moreover, much of the tenant disputes which arise 
under a crop·sharing system and which create bad feelings 
between the landlord and the tenant, can be eliminated. 
These reasons have led the landlord to adopt a fixed rent 
system. In South Corea the estimation system is adopted 
extensively, while the measurement system is universally 
found in North Corea. In the Case of dry fields, the fixed 
rent system is most generaIiy adopted followed by the other 
two systems. 
The foregoing systems are most generally found in 
Corea, but there are several other forms, one of which is. 
the permanent tenant system. Under this system the long 
standing cusi:om gives the tenant the right to sell or transfer 
" foJl!l~n~'I!I rJlll%i'i!iJ!f!!!J Ji';I1Y%Ii~i\~ p. 302-Shiro Kawada. Ag";cu/· 
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tenant right to others without the consent of the landlord, 
and the landlord cannot take back the rented field from the 
tenant unless the latter commits a grievous offense, without 
indemnifying the tenant's loss. The great majority of these 
tenant fields have come down from the remote past and 
very few of them have been so determined legally. The 
rent under the permanent tenant system is usllally little 
lower than that of other systems,· and usually the tenant 
bears the tax burden and expenses for irrigation and other 
similar incidents. 
There is still another tenant system called Kariwake-
kosaku which is a sort of crop-sharing system. Under this 
system the standing grain is divided between the landlord 
and the tenant. It is adopted in one of the following three 
cases: first, when no agreement has been reached by the 
two parties in their effort to estimate the crop; secondly, 
when no agreement has been arrived at a dispute arising 
from a bad crop usually due to some natural calamity; 
thirdly, when the nature of crop fluctuates on account of 
the barrenness of the soil. 
We also must not forget the practice of re-tenanting. 
This is a practice under which a tenant rents out his field 
to someone else. In the great majority of cases it is adopt-
ed secreily or in the silent acquiescence of the landlord. 
A government investigation into the various practices of 
tenancy in Corea shows the following cases for the adoption 
of re-tenancy: 
1. When a tenant, who on account of either a tradi-
tional custom or a special agreement has secured a per-
manent tenant right, re-rents the field to someone else; and 
when a tenant re-rents his rented field to someone else 
either for payment or no payment, on account of the sickness 
of a member of his family or because of other similar 
reasons. 
2. When a tenant allows his friend or relative, who 
either has only a small field or cannot rent a field from 
any landlord, to till ~ part of his own rented field; or when 
----------------_._- .-----
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he rents a field from a landlord for the purpose of trans-
ferring tenancy right to some unfortunate ones. 
3. When those who have been entrusted with a strip 
of field by a landlord re-rents it for commercial purposes. 
(Recognition or silent assent is usually given by the landlord 
for the action.) 
4. When the manager of the field or the tenant rents 
a large tract of land for the purpose of renting it out to a 
third party for a profit. 
There is no doubt that the foregoing methods of fe-rent-
ing lessen the profits of the tenant who actually tills the 
soil and hinder the development of agr·iculture in general. 
Nor can it be denied that the middle man in whose name 
the former tills the soil is an exploiter pure and simple. and 
the whole system resembles the sweating system of domestic 
industry Verlagssystem. 
Lastly, there is the collective tenancy under which the 
land is rented by several tenants collectively and it is tilled 
collectively by them who employ a colIective fund for 
tillage. In some cases the aggregate amount of crop is 
divided among the tenants. In others the rented land is 
divided into separate strips for the purpose of individual 
tillage. The collective tenancy is of various kinds, as there 
are several different methods of dividing the profit and of 
paying the wage; and also the nature of tillage is varied_ 
This system has also been practised in Japan even in the 
remote past, and in recent years it has become the main 
undertaking of tenant unions. Agricultural associations have 
been encouraging the adoption of the system, while some 
landowners are favoring it by actually participation in the 
undertaking. 
The various tenancy systems above mentioned are alI 
crude in nature, and although a tenant tills his field indepen-
dently of the landlord, he is yet to be included among 
laborers_ Nor is his renumeration any better than usual 
wage. His income never contains anything that can be 
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Japanese tenants, a Corean tenant should be regarded as a 
laborer. I am firmly convinced that they all should not be 
regarded as entrepreneur." Corean tenants are poorer than 
Japanese tenants and their economic condition is much 
worse than that of tenants in Japan Proper. One is indeed 
greatly amazed by the low and crude economy of those poor 
agricultural people in Corea. 
Although the tenant system in Japan Proper is also 
crude and primitive, since the fixed rent system is generally 
adopted there, the J apnanese tenants get the benefit of a 
good crop and thus they receive sometimes a renumeration 
over and above what can be regarded as their wages. But 
since the crop'sharing system is generally adopted in Corea, 
the tenants only get one half of the gain, and since the 
crop per strip is usually much less in Corea than in Japan 
Proper, the tanants' share of the gain is much smaller than 
that of the Japanese tenants. Under a crop-sharing system, 
the tenant realizes that the half of the benefit arising from 
his extra endeavours and industriousness will go to the 
pocket of the landlord, and this greatly discourages him 
and prevents the general agricultural improvement. This 
is why improvement of agriculture is always difficult under 
a share system. Thus there is much room for general 
improvement in the tenant systems of Corea. 
2. THE NATURE AND METHODS OF 
TENANT CONTRACTS 
As in any other crude and primitive tenant systems 
including that of Japan Proper, tenant contracts in Corea 
are made verbally and it is very seldom that the terms of 
tenancy are set down in a written form. However, even iIi 
the past, exceptions to this general rule existed in the case 
of the fields owned by land companies or big landowners 
who happened to live in a remote distance. In recent 
7) Shiro Kawada, Agricultural labor and the Tenant's System. 
do. Agricultural Problems and their Solution . 
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years, however, many tenant disputes arose, thus encourag-
ing written contracts which set down the rights and re-
sponsibilities of the tenant and the landlord and tending to 
diminish the number of disputes. The new agreements are 
particularly welcomed by the agriculturists living near big 
cities, as in the case of Japan Proper. 
There are two kinds of written contracts. The one is 
the ordinary formal contract and the other is what in Corea 
is known as the "tenant note" or the "tenancy·transfer 
note" which is a kind of notice or permit handed by the 
landlord to his tenant allowing him to cultivate a given 
tenant field. This latter agreement has been adopted ex-
tensively in the past and it is so simple that it can hardly 
be called a contract. It does not contain any specific con· 
dition of tenancy but only tells so and so is entitled to till 
a particular field. 
Guarantors are usually needed for a written tenant 
contract, but they are seldom needed in the case of an oral 
agreement. The absence of a guarantor in the case of a 
verbal agreement can be explained by the fact that this 
form of agreement has come down from the past when 
both the landlord and the tenant were bound by customs 
and by moral responsibility. But, since the written agreement 
in Corea is usually adopted in the case of Japanese landlords 
and Corean tenants, and as it came into existence because 
of the desire of tenants to place themselves on an equal 
footing with iandlords by making tenancy-relations merely 
relations of contract, the landlords also require of the tenants 
to have sureties. 
When a tenant contract is made, a deposit is some-
times paid by the tenant to the landlord. In some cases 
such a deposit is regarded as an advance payment of the 
next year's rent. In a few exceptional cases a part or alI 
of the rent is paid in cash. 
At the time of the expiration of a contract, if the tenant 
has scrupulously observed its provisions, and otherwise 
fulfilled his obligations, he is alIowed to continue to till the 
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field. However, the landlord is' free to take back the field 
from his tenant at his own will. When a landlord dies, 
his heir becomes his successor and new party to the con-
tract. When a tenant dies, his heir usually is allowed to 
succeed to the former tenant by becoming a new party to 
the contract. But sometimes a third person is allowed to 
till the field formerly tenanted by a dead person, provided 
the former pays a proper compensation to the latter's family. 
The landlord is free to take back the tenant land in case 
there is no proper person among the dead tenant's re-
latives. 
Most tenant contracts do not have any specific provision 
regarding their effectiveness in case the sale or transfer of 
the field takes place, and customs regarding this matter are 
various. Of course, when the transfer of the field is accom-
panied by the agreement that no change shall be made re-
garding its tenancy, or when the new owner does not feel 
the necessity of changing tenants, the old contract has its 
practical force and the tenant continues to tiIl the field as 
in the past. 
As to the abandonment of contracts, as a contract is 
usually made in November or December, after the harvest, 
its abandonment is made usually near the vernal equinox 
of the following spring, unless under extraordinary circums-
tances. When a contract is abandoned, the field is returned 
to the .landlord usually after it has been restored to its 
original condition. As the crop goes to the tenant, the field 
is returned to the landlord after the harvest, but sometimes 
the field is divided between the new and old tenants and 
held until the time of the harvest. In all cases the 
abandonment is made known to the landlord either orally 
or by a written notice. Abandonment of contracts seldom 
takes place, the following cases being· most numerous:S) 
1. When the tenant fails to pay his rent or otherwise 
fails to fulfil the provisions of the contract. 
S) An Investigation into the Practict'.s of Tenancy in Corea, p. 191. 
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2. When the tenant does not follow the dictate of the 
landowner regarding the selection of the quality and kind 
of rice which is to be made over to the landowner as rent, 
or when the tenant does not take the work· of tillage 
seriously. 
3. When the tenant has re·rented out the field or sold 
the tenant·right, without the landlord's consent. 
4. When the tenant has either transformed the outward 
form of the field without the consent of the landlord or 
damaged it 
In some cases the landlord abandons a contract simply 
because he wants to take back the field or because he 
wants to rent it out to his relative. In other cases the 
tenant wants to abandon a contract because of his sickness, 
lack of workers, change of residence or of vocation. Still 
in other cases the field is taken back by the landlord or 
his agent because of some ill feeling against the tenant. 
At any rate, the rights of tenants are not firmly secured 
against the unjust actions of the landlord. When the 
landlord wishes to abandon a contract at a time later than 
the day of "Shunbun," the tenant has a right to demand 
compensation for his investment in the form of seeds, 
fertilizers, etc., valued at the market prices of the time 
the compensation is to be made; and the compensation is 
to be paid either by the landlord or the new tenant. Since 
the second crop belongs to the tenant, the field is returned 
to the landlord after the final harvest, even though the 
landlord abandons a contract before the vernal equinox. 
When a contract is abandoned at the initiative of the tenant, 
or because of his misconduct, no compensation is usually 
made by the landlord. For the desolation of a field, the 
tenant has to make compensation, but such cases are quite 
few. 
The foregoing investigation into the content and meth· 
ods of tenant contracts, their abandonment, and compensa· 
tion thereof, reveals the fact that tenant systems in. Corea 
are generally in a quite undeveloped condition; that tenants 
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have wry imperfect ideas of tenant rights; and that their 
social as well as economic position in society is extremely 
low. Relations between the landlord and the tenant are 
largely regulated by customs which tend to operate in the 
landlord's favour, and thus the rights of the tenant are in 
constant danger. However, transformation is taking place 
in the nature of these relations, due to changes in modern 
ideas and economic systems; and the hitherto moral rela-
tions of tenancy are more and more transformed into legaL 
relations, and are regarded as merely economic facts. As 
the result of this transformation, the methods and conditions 
of tenant contracts as well as those of abandonment of con-
tracts have been gradually modernized. However, the funda-
mental betterment of the systems in general will take much 
time. 
3. PERIODS OF TENANCY AND RENT 
In all countries whose tenant systems are in an undeve-
loped stage, some tenant contracts are made orally and the 
periods of contracts naturally are not specifically mentioned. 
Under such contracts, both the landlord and the tenant are 
free to cancel their contracts, and the only customary 
limitation upon their action is the understanding that the 
cancellation shaH take place at a time which is most con-
venient to both parties and which is likely to cause the 
least loss to them. Tenant systems in Corea are no excep-
tion to this general rule. However, as has been already 
explained, an increase in tenant disputes has caused the 
development of written contracts; and the personal, moral 
relations of tenancy have been transformed into legal rel~­
tions. And, with the adoption of written forms of contracts, 
the necessity of inserting the periods of contracts has begun 
to be felt. 
In most cases, the period of contract is between three 
and five years, but sometimes it is as long as ten years 
and as short as. one year. And, where the old customs 
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still exist the period of tenancy is regarded as one year, 
. but as a matter of fact the period is extended indefinitely 
unless some specific period is mentioned or some extraor-
dinary thing happens. Thus the period of one year exists 
only for convenience' sake." It is not seldom that the field 
is tilled by the same tenant for twenty or thirty years, and 
in some case for two or three generations. In concluding 
a written contract, the landlord generally desires to have 
as short a period as possible, believing that the shorter the 
period the fewer tenant troubles there will he. 
Generally speaking, short periods of tenant contracts 
encourage reckless cultivation of the soil. As Corean tenants 
are reckless in cultivating their fields and fertilizing them 
to a very limited extent, the effect of the short period con-
tract will be doubly disastrous; and thus will prevent the 
future progress of the tenant systems in Corea. 
As to tenant rent in Corea, I have already pointed out 
that there are three different kinds, namely, the' fixed 
system, the estimation system, and the measurement system. 
Different localities have different systems. In the case of 
the fixed rent for rice paddies, a mean of the crops of 
several years in the past is taken as the standard and its 
40 or 50 percent is levied as rent. In the case of dry rice 
fields, 30 or 40 percent of a similar mean is taken as rent. 
However, sometimes rent is fixed at 30 or 40 percent of 
the value of the field. Under the estimation system about 
50 percent of the estimated crop is fixed as rent. In the 
case of the measurement system, about one half of the crop 
is fixed as rent. In actual practice, the amount of rent 
differ in different localities and with different landlords. 
In the case of rice paddies, rent is paid usually in the 
form of rice, and seldom in other farm products or money. 
But in the case of dry fields, payment in kind is seldom 
made, and money and substitutes are more often used. 
9) An Investigation into the Practice of Tenancy. p. IS5-An Investigation 
into the land tenure system and the economic condition of the farmers, publ. 
by the provincial office of Zenra-Hoku-Do, Corea, p. 12. , 
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Unhulled rice is usually used in the payment of paddies, 
and very seldom hulled rice is turned in. In the case of 
dry fields, wheat and soy beans are made over as rent, but 
sometimes cotton, millet, barn-yard grass, sesame, red beans, 
green peas, carrots, hemp, tobacco, and corn, are turned 
over to the landlord. 
In the district of Zenra-Nan-Do, payment of rent in the 
case of paddy fields 98 percent rent is made in kind, while 
payment in cash is made in two percent, and no substitute 
is used. In the case of dry fields in the same district, 58 
percent of rent is paid in kind, 2 percent in money, and 
40 percent in substitute ;10) in Zenra-Hoku-Do rent for paddy 
fields, 90 percent in kind, 10 percent in money; that for 
dry fields, 80 percent in kind, 10 percent in money, and 10 
percent in substitute.''' In some districts payment can be 
made either in kind or in money, and usually the method of 
conversion is standardized. In some mountainous districts, 
rent for paddy fields is also often paid in cash because of 
the difficulty in transportation of rice. Although payment 
in money can be regarded as more progressive a method than 
others, there are exceptions which should not be fqrgotten. 
Lastly I must mention the fact that the amount of rent 
depends much upon its ratio to the crop, the kinds of fields, 
irrigation and various facilities of cultivation, expenses for 
public works and improvement, financial burdens of seeds 
and fertilizers, methods of tenancy, second crops and by-
products, and the prices of farm products in general. 
The following figures showing the ratio of rent to the 
crop in Zenra-Nan-Do are based upon an official investiga-
tion with a county as a unit:-
Rent 











10) An Investigation into the practices etc. p. 207. 
Ordinary 
40% or 50% 
50% 
50% or 60% 
11) An Investigation into the land tenure ·system etc. p. 13. 
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Sometimes it happens that, due to the lack of a proper 
method of estimation, the amount of rent in the case of 
the estimation rent system is as high as 70 percent of the 
crop. On the other hand, it also happens that the amount 
of rent under the other systems is low as 30 percent. 
However, those ratios will become different when one takes 
-into consideration the fact that sometimes the second crops 
and by·products go to the tenant, and that in other times 
the financial burdens of various kinds are shifted on to the 
tenant. In the caSe of other districts in Corea, the highest 
amount of rent in the case of rice paddies has ben found 
to be about 70 percent while the lowest is 30 percent, the 
average being about 50 percent. In the district of Keisho 
Nan·do, however, the highest has been found to be 80 per-
cent, while the lowest point is 30 percent, the average 
being about 50 percent. 
Since the rent in the case of dry fields are made over 
chiefly in money and substitutes, it is difficult to show ratio 
between the rent and the crop. The following figures taken 
from investigations in Zenra-Nan-do show ratios between 
the rent and the total amount of all crops-ordinary crop, 
the second crop, and the so-called intermediary crop:-
Rent Maximum 
Fixed rent system 30 % 






20% or 30% 
50% 
Thus it is clear that the rent of dry rice fields is 
cheaper than that of paddy rice fields. However, in other 
districts, the maximum amount of rent of dry fields is as 
high as 70 or 80 percent, while the minimum amount is 
about 30 percent, the ordinary amount being 40 or 50 per-
cent. This great variation is due to the fact that the crop 
of dry fields is regarded as important in some districts, 
while in other districts it is regarded as otherwise. 
Next I shall consider the ratio between the rent and prices 
of fields. Just as the former fluctuates, the latter also changes, 
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and for this reason what we can do is to show the ratio 
which prevailed in a certain district for a certain period. 
The following figures show the rent and its ratio to the 
prices of the fields in Zenra-Nan-do in 1921, one tan being 
taken as a unit :_1!) 




Fixed rent system 
Measurement system 
Estimation system 








It should be remembered that the first two rent systems 
are adopted in the case of pabdy rice fields, while the third 
system, namely, the estimation system is adopted in dry 
fields. 
The following figures show the ratio of dry fields: 
Prices of fields 
10 yen 
Rent (dry fields) 




Amount of rent 





The foregoing figures show that because the land price 
in Corea is usually low, ratio of rent to the price of the 
field is 10 or 15 percent. Since the price of the field is 
determined by the amount of rent taken together with the 
prevailing rate of interest, and since the prevailing rate of 
interest in Corea is usually between 10 and 30 percent, it 
seems natural that the ratio of rent to the price of the field 
should be 10 01' 15 percent. The ratio is lower than the 
ordinary rate of interest because of the general fact that 
in Corea the price-exchange value of fields-is usually 
higher than their capital value. The same law applied in 
the case of Japan Proper where the ordinary rate of interest 
is six or seven percent but the profit of landlords is three 
or four percent of the price of their fields. As long as the 
ordinary rate of interest in Corea is higher than that of 
12) An lnVt;~tjglliiDn into the practice of tenancy, p. 226. 
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Japan Proper, the prices of fields of tM fonner should be 
cheaper than that of the latter; and as long as this is the 
case, it is but natural that the rate of interest in tenant 
investment (rent) in Corea should be higher than that of 
Japan Proper. 
Not much fluctuation in the amount of rent has been 
-seen in recent years. However, in recent years rent is 
taking an upward trend due to various causes, such as the 
advancement in the method of cultivation, the perfecting of 
irrigation, the extension and development of communication 
and transportation, rise in the prices of general commodities, 
and increase in taxes and other public incidences. Moreover, 
as is the case with almost everywhere, landlords in Corea 
often raise rent in order to increase the value of their lands. 
Rent in Zenra·Hoku-do has been raised 25 or 30 percent 
during the past ten years, for which the following three 
causes have been pointed out in a government report. In 
the first place, there has been a practice under which lands 
are sold after rents thereof have been raised. Secondly, 
there was government restriction of raising of rent before 
Corea was annexed to Japan, but there is now no such 
restriction. Thirdly, there are many tenant farmers who 
like to secure lands regardless of high rent. The second 
-cause arrests our special attention. 
Next I schall consider how an increase or decrease in 
rent is made. There has been no case in which rent was 
raised for a temporary purpose, but it is often reduced in 
case of a bad crop, the latter custom being a universal 
phenomenon in Corea as in elsewhere. The degree of re-
ducl!ion is dependent upon the kind of rent system and the 
landlord. Under the fixed rent system, rent is totally ex-
empted if the crop is an absolute failure or if it is less than 
the seeds; and, if the crop is about a half of the usual 
amount, rent is paid not according to the fixed system, but 
according to the measurement system, or sometimes it is 
reduced flatly by 50 percent. No reduction is usually made 
jf the crop is more than about 80 percent of its usual 
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amount. Under the measurement system, a total exemp-
tion is made if the crop is below 20 percent of the usual 
amount. Under the estimation system, if the crop is less 
by 20 percent of the amount which had been estimated, a 
reduction is made. Permanent increase or decrease in rent 
is seldom seen in Corea. When, however, the land is 
improved or its irrigation bettered, the landlord often raises 
the rent from 50 to 60 percent of the crop. On the other 
hand, if the land is damaged, say, by flood, the rent is re-
duced, although such a case is highly exceptional. So far 
no reduction in rent has been brought about through the 
organized power of tenants in Corea. 
I shall next take up the time, place, methods, and 
measurement, of rent. Rent is paid, under the fixed and 
estimation systems, either in November or December; under 
the measurement system, it is paid immediately after the 
harvest. Under the fixed and estimation systems, rent is 
paid either at the residence of the landlord or at the re-
sidence of a tenant manager known as .. Shaon," or at the 
place designated by the landlord. Under the measurement 
system, rent is paid either at the spot or at the place 
designated by the landlord. Under the former two systems, 
rice is made over as rent with one koku of unhulled rice 
contained in a sack as a unit; while under the measure-
ment system, it is made over either in rice stacks or in 
unhulled rice. Strict regulation has been placed over the 
quality of rice, most landlords insisting that tenants should 
use the "improved seeds." Some landlords charge addi-
tional rent of one to per one koku of rice which is not of 
the improved seeds. Because of an inferior method of refin-
ing rice, Corean rice has been much cheaper than Japanese 
rice in the past; and for this reason much attention has 
been directed to this shortcoming in recent years, even 
prizes being offered for tenants who produce superior rice. 
It is now widely recognized that Corean rice has been 
much improved in recent years. 
Rent in kind is usually measured by the "masu" a 
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square box but no levelling pin is generally used. But 
those who use the pin insist on absolutely pure rice, while 
those, who do not usually make an additional payment of 
five go of rice for everyone to of rice. Where weight is 
used in the measurement of rent, 160 kin is regarded as 
the minimum for one koku while about 175 kin is regarded 
as the standard. But in some districts, notably in Zenra 
Hoko·do, 180 kin or 200 kin is regarded as equivalent to 
one koku. Transportation expenses within the distance of 
two or three ri are borne by the tenant. Expenses for 
transporting rice from the field to the resident of the ten· 
ant manager is usually borne by the tenant, while that of 
transporting it from the manager's residence to the land· 
lord's is borne by the landlord. 
A very few Corean tenants are delinquent in paying 
their rent. If delinquency is frequent, the contract is reo 
pudiated; but failure to pay for two or three months is 
not regarded as a sufficient reason for the repudiation. 
There are several preventive measures for the delinquency. 
4. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 
As has already been pointed out, the tenant systems 
of Corea are still in an undeveloped stage; and, in can· 
sequence, the rights and obligations of both the landlord 
and the tenant are largely fixed by customs; and in a very 
few cases are they set down specifically in written con· 
tracts. Generally speaking, regulations regarding the taxes 
and other public incidents vary in different localities and 
according to differences in the qualities of cultivated fields. 
The land tax in Corea is fixed at seventeen thousandth of 
the land value, and, in principle, is to be borne by the 
owner of the land. However, in actual practice, the tax 
burden is shifted to the tenant, except in the case of some 
Corean landowners and the majority of Japanese landowners. 
As to other public incidepts, they are also often shifted to 
i; 
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the tenant. We have already seen that part of irrigation 
expenses is usually shifted to the tenant. An official report 
of the tenant practices in Zenra·Hoku·do says: "Although 
most landlords shift the tax and other public incidents to 
their tenants, the Oriental Development Company and other 
Japanese landowners in Zenra·Hoku·do bear those financial 
burdens; they, however, impose somewhat heavier rent 
upon their tenants." 
It is clear that in the case of those Japanese land-
owners, the taxes are also shifted to the tenants, in actulity, 
either in part or in all. Under the measurement system, 
all Corean landlords bear one half of the tax burdens, 
while under the fixed rent system, about eighty percent of 
landlords bear all the burdens, the remaining twenty per-
cent shifting them on to the tenants. The tenants pay 
additional unhulled rice as the land tax. In some districts 
three to of unhulled rice is paid for everyone tan of 
field. As to the repairing of roads, water ways, dykes, and 
banks, they are usually born by tenants if not much actual 
expense is involved. But in case a large expenditure is 
needed, such works are usually done by the landlords, 
although the tenants are to contribute their labour. When 
an organization is established for the purpose of carrying 
out such works, the landlords also are required to furnish 
cash, while the tenants are to contribute labour. 
We shall next consider the various limitations which 
are placed upon the tenants' right to utilize the field. In 
the case of paddy rice fields, kinds of product are usually 
determined, while sometimes the qualities of seeds are also 
regulated by the landlords. Sometimes the landlords cultivate 
rice sprouts and distribute them among their tenants who 
must plant them. Some landlords dislike to have their 
tenants derive a second crop, and forbid them to do so. 
As to dry fields where the fixed rent is adopted, there is 
no restriction as to the selection of products. However, 
there is some form of restriction placed in the case of the 
measurement system. Under the fixed rent system, the 
... ----------"------------------------
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cultivation of such a tree as the mulberry tree is allowed 
on the condition that the field shall be restored to the 
original condition upon the cancellation of the contract. 
Under the measurement system, the planting of trees and 
permanent plants usually is not allowed; but some tenants 
disregard this general rule and cultivate them without the 
'landlord's permission, in which case no compensation is 
made by the landlord for these trees or plants upon the 
cancellation of the contract. The tenants are usually free 
to cultivate plants on the dykes of the field, but some 
landlords dislike the practice. As I have already pointed 
out on a previous occasion, a tenant is forbidden to trans-
form the form of a field, but sometimes this is allowed on 
condition that the field shall be restored to the original 
form at the cancellation of the contract. Desolation of the 
field through the negligence of the tenant is universally 
forbidden. 
As already mentioned re-tenanting without consent of 
the landlord is usually forbidden, but sometimes a field is 
re-rented out to some one by a tenant with silent consent 
of the landlord, although this practice has been greatly 
lessened because of the warning of the landlords against it. 
As re-tenanting is not usually recognized by customs, no 
direct legal relation exists between the landlord and the 
person who re·tenants the field, and the contractual relation 
between the landlord and the tenant remains the same. 
Only an oral agreement is usually made between the tenant 
and the re-tenant as to the division of the crop. The 
landlord usually does not charge any extra rent, but some-
times he gets additional charge of less than ten percent of 
the regular rent. The tenant gets from the re-tenant a 
rent of between ten and thirty percent of the regular rent, 
or a part of the crop which varies between five and twenty 
five percent of the crop. The re-tenant usually gets be-
tween 25 and 40 percent of the whole amount of the crop 
as his share. Sometimes a tenant rents out the field for 
the cultivation of a second crop for the payment of 
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about four yen for every tan of land, or only straws, as 
rent. 
The sale of standing grain or other things attached to 
tenancy seldom takes place, due chiefly to the tenant's 
moving from one place to another, sickness, or extreme 
difficulty of livelihood, and variation of prices. The sale of 
tenant right also is occasioned by the foregoing causes; it 
is often sold along with a house. Neither does this take 
place often. The price of tenant right is usually 20 or 30 
percent of the rent. In Corea, the sale of tenant right is 
less oftener done than that of standing grain. This is 
natural in view of the fact that tenant right in Corea can 
hardly be called a right. Since the validity of its sale is 
dependent upon the will of the landlord, a very few persons 
care' to purchase it. 
In order to have a clear knowledge of the relations 
between the landlord and the tenant, one must consider 
the part played by those who administer or supervise the 
various works of tenant fields. Where a landlord does not 
live near the tenant field, he usually has a manager who 
is known by the name of "Shaon." Such a landlord also 
has several other persons whose work is to study the can· 
dition of the tenant field, to supervise the payment of the 
rent, and to do other things relating to tenancy. It is easy 
to see that a landlord who is away from the farm is ignor-
ant of its real condition and the status of the tenants, fails 
to improve the affairs relating to tenancy, and allow the 
tenants to undergo unnecessary suffering; while, on the other 
hand, his servants who stand between him and the tenants, 
are hard on the latter. The Oriental Development Com-
pany has farm-superintendents who do the work of a 
" Shaon." 
The Shaon does almost everything relating to tenancy 
-such .as the selection and movement of tenants, the 
decision, inspection, payment, depositing, of the rent, the 
inspection of the tenant farm, the investigation and decision 
of rent reduction, the payment of taxes and other public 
, 
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incidents in the name of the landlord, supervision over the 
improvement of the tenant farm, making and unmaking of 
tenant contracts. The recent tendency is to restrict the 
power of the Shaon. A Shaon gets the following renumera-
tions for his service: 
1. About three percent of the total amount of the rent 
actually paid. 
2. Fifteen sen for everyone koku of unhulled rice 
made over as rent. 
3. Right to cultivate a field from two to five tan free 
of rent. 
4. In the case of a big landowning company, he gets 
a monthly salary of ten or fifteen yen besides travelling 
expenses. 
The first and second renumerations are the most com-
mon in actual practice. But a Shaon usually gets either 
money or farm products from the tenants. Other officials 
also do work similar to that of a Shaon. They also get 
additional renumerations frem tenants. In some cases, a 
Shaon supervises a farm which is as large as 50 chobu 
(= 1 ha.) while the smallest area being one chobu. Although 
a Shaon is in a position where he can contribute towards 
the advancement of the welfare of both the landlord and 
the tenants, by listening to the demands of the latter and 
by bringing about understanding between the two parties, 
it is also undeniable that he is liable to commit various 
wrongs, such as enriching himself at the expense of one of 
the parties by various fraudulent methods. The same thing 
can be said of other officials. This is why the progressive 
farms tend to discard him in recent years. 
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